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Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: A Further
Inquiry
CHRISTINE G. COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine and the sovereign immunity doctrine
have caused considerable comment, controversy, and confusion in
recent years, both in and outside the courtroom.' Although courts
have been called upon to consider the doctrines together, commen-
tators have seldom done S0.2 Yet the act of state doctrine and the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Note, A New Approach to the Act of State Doctrine: Turning Exceptions
Into the Rule, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 273, 273 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Turning Excep-
tions Into the Rule], which discusses the inability of the courts to "synthesize this congres-
sional directive with case precedent, constitutional considerations, and its own concern for
justice, into a workable and acceptable Act of State Doctrine"; Legislative Note, Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of Foreign States, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 1225, 1227 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Jurisdictional Immunities], in which the author asserts that the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity owes more to "judicial precedent and executive policy than to any clearly
defined rationale." See also Brower, Bistline and Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200 (1979); Golbert, Bradford, The Act of
State Doctrine: Dunhill and Other Sabbatino Progeny, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1977); Gordon,
The Origin and Development of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 595 (1977);
Hawk, Act of State Doctrine, Noerr-Pennington Abroad and Foreign Government Compul-
sion Defense, 47 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 987 (1978); Jacobs, King and Rodriguez, The Act of
State Doctrine: A History of Jucidial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 677
(1977); Lowenfeld, Act of State and Department of State: First National Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 66 J. INT'L L. 795 (1972); von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits
of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J.
429 (1977).
2. One writer commented on both in Recent Developments, Doctrines of Sovereign Im-
munity and Act of State - Conflicting Consequences of State Department Intervention,
25 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Conflicting Consequences of State Dep't
Intervention]. Of course there are many others, particularly if one includes those who inci-
dentally consider the doctrines concurrently. Textbooks may or may not handle the doc-
trines together. See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LIssrrzYN, & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 100-52, 642-98 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMANN, LissrrzyN, &
PUGH], in which act of state is considered illustrative of the relationship between national
and international law while sovereign immunity is discussed under the topic "jurisdictional
immunities"; H. STErnER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND
TEXT 637-728 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STEINER & VAGTS], in which the authors treat
both doctrines in the context of "Local Courts and Foreign Sovereignty." As to courts han-
dling both doctrines in the same cases, see notes 55 and 56 infra. See also Timberg, Sover-
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doctrine of sovereign immunity are strikingly similar in principle
and in purpose. Briefly, "act of state" refers to the principle that
the courts of one nation will not judge the validity of the acts of a
foreign government committed within that foreign government's
territority. Transnationally, s sovereign immunity means that no
sovereign will be subject to suit without its consent.4
This article will trace the history of the cases in which both doc-
trines are rooted. The effect of differing rationales behind the two
doctrines upon these decisions will be explored and the allocation
of power among the three branches of United States government
and its influence upon sovereign immunity and act of state will be
considered. Finally, the article will discuss the tension between the
concept of sovereignty and the concept of international law as it
relates to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and act of state.
THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE
The earliest case in the United States involving the doctrine of
sovereign immunity on an international level was The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden.5 This litigation provides a fascinating in-
eign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion,
55 TExAS L. REV. 1 (1976); Note International Law-Act of State Doctrine-Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976-Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 18 B.C.
IND. & COMM. L. REv. 318 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dunhill Note].
3. The domestic analogues to the doctrine of sovereign immunity on an international
scale will be discussed briefly as bearing on the reasons for the development of the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity. See text accompanying notes 44-47 infra. At both levels,
the doctrines show similarities, but a major difference is that domestic sovereign immunity
deals with the vertical relationship of a government to its people, while international sover-
eign immunity concerns the horizontal relationships of sovereigns. See also Tribe, Intergov-
ernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Is-
sues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 682 (1976). Throughout this
paper, the phrase "sovereign immunity" refers to the doctrine on a transnational level.
4. In general, this paper will not deal with diplomatic or consular immunity since they
are generally recognized as based on different principles than are sovereign immunity and
act of state. Dinstein, Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium, 1 IsRAEL L. REV. 407, 410 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Dinstein].
5. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F. Cas. 574 (No.
9697) (Pa. Adm. 1781), is cited by National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,
358 (1955), and by Conflicting Consequences of State.Dep't Intervention, supra note 2, at
168 as a case predating The Schooner Exchange, and involving the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The report of the Moitez case merely states that "mariners enlisting on board a
ship of war, or vessel belonging to a sovereign independent state, cannot libel against a ship
for wages due." The headnote of the case does not mention sovereign immunity, as would be
expected at that early date; but it does not even suggest it. Be that as it may, The Schooner
Exchange is undoubtedly the first Supreme Court decision based on the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, and it is commonly considered to be the first case of its kind in the United
States. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 1, at 1228; and Recent Decision,
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troduction to the recurring themes contained in the doctrines of
sovereign immunity and act of state.' McFadden and Greetham
filed a libel against The Exchange, a ship which the two men
claimed they owned, but which had been taken from them on the
high seas under Napoleon's orders. At the time of the lawsuit, the
ship was in the port of Philadelphia.
The executive department filed a suggestion that the case be dis-
missed because (1) the ship had acted in conformity with interna-
tional law in its conduct in the harbor,7 and (2) it was subject to
the jurisdiction of France, not to that of the United States.8 The
attorneys from the executive department9 argued that an assertion
of jurisdiction by the Court would be tantamount to a "judicial
declaration of war," 10 as well as a judicial usurpation of executive
and legislative functions.1"
The attorney for the libellant attempted to distinguish the pri-
vate acts of a sovereign from the public acts of a sovereign, the
latter being acknowledged by both sides as immune.12 Libellant's
attorney further argued that sovereignty is purely local and cannot
be exercised extraterritorially, so that Napoleon could not make
any claims on a ship outside his territory." The Court agreed that
territorial jurisdiction is an attribute of the sovereign, but found as
a corollary of this principle that a foreign sovereign cannot be the
object of jurisdiction of the domestic sovereign.14 The Court fur-
Sovereign Immunity-Decision of the State Department to Recognize and Allow Claim of
Sovereign Immunity Precludes Jurisdiction of American Courts and Is Not Subject to Re-
view Under Administrative Procedure Act, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 215 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Decision of the State Dep't].
6. Justice Rehnquist noted that both doctrines have a common source in The Schooner
Exchange. He emphasized the common element of comity, and remarked that this aspect
tends to pose questions of policy rather than law. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
7. The behavior in conformance with international law referred to the fact that the ves-
sel entered the territory of the United States out of necessity, in need of repair and refresh-
ment, rather than deliberately and with no proper purpose. 11 U.S. at 118.
8. Chief Justice Marshall noted that his procedure of executive suggestion was proper.
Id. at 147.
9. In this litigation the attorneys opposing the libellants were representatives of the ex-
ecutive branch; both the vessel and frame were unrepresented at trial.
10. 11 U.S. at 126. It was the United States Attorney for Pennsylvania who appeared on
behalf of the United States Government.
11. "The right to demand redress belongs to the executive department, which alone rep-
resents the sovereignty of the nation in its intercourse with other nations." Id. at 132.
12. Id. at 119, 145.
13. Id. at 127.
14. Id. at 137.
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ther noted that The Exchange, as a public armed ship, was part of
a foreign military force, "under the immediate and direct com-
mand of the sovereign."15 The armed ship was thus assimilated to
the concept of territory; to attack the ship would be to attack the
sovereign. 16
The arguments before the Court pointed to treaties on interna-
tional law,1 7 but greatest stress was placed on the domestic ana-
logues to sovereign immunity. Indeed, the Court placed primary
reliance for its decision on domestic law, although it made allu-
sions to international law.18 The issue, as framed by the Court, was
"whether an American citizen can assert, in an American court, a
title to an armed national vessel, found within the waters of the
United States."1e The Court held that the ship was not subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States' 0 and dismissed the case.
Implicit in the Court's reasoning was reliance upon the nature of
sovereignty: sovereigns are inherently equal; for one sovereign to
attempt to assert jurisdiction over another would be an affront to
the dignity of the sovereign.'1 Comity among nations requires the
15. Id. at 144.
16. A further argument presented by the libellant, but one without precedential author-
ity, was that the sovereign of the foreign government is liable to his nationals for unlawful
seizures, so it should likewise be liable to the United States citizens for unlawful seizures.
To hold otherwise, continued the argument, would be to sacrifice individual rights to respect
for a sovereign, "[y]our government not redressing their wrongs, but giving a sanction to
their spoiliators." Id. at 128. The libellant then cited cases affirming the right of a court to
examine the legality of this kind of act, but the argument did not prevail. Id. at 129. The
cases cited by the libellant do not appear to be apposite to his argument. Interestingly, some
of those cases contain incipient notions of the distinctions between public acts and commer-
cial acts. See Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810); Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 241 (1808); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).
17. The libellant cited, inter alia, the treatises of Bynkershoek and Martins. This choice
of scholars brought a scornful protest from his adversary, "[This case should not be decided]
upon the authority of the slovenly treatise of Bynkershoek, or the ravings of that sciolist
Martins, but upon the broad principles of national law, and national independence." 11 U.S.
at 135.
18. Id. at 136.
19. Id. at 135.
20. The Court stated:
[Tihe Exchange, being a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign,
with whom the government of the United States is at peace, and having entered
an American port open for her reception, on the terms of which ships of war are
generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must be considered as
having come into the American territory, under an implied promise [from the
American sovereign], that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a
friendly manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.
Id. at 147.
21. For a similar case in the British courts, see the Parlement Belge 5 P.D. 197 (Court of
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doctrine of sovereign immunity. Thus, in this very early case the
Court dealt with notions of sovereignty and the concepts flowing
therefrom. First, the relations among sovereigns involves ideas of
(a) comity, friendly relations, fairness, and dominance of the sover-
eign over its subjects, (b) territorial independence of sovereigns,
and (c) some of the commercial activities performed by the sover-
eign being outside its sovereign character."2 Second, the conduct of
the American sovereign, being governed by the Constitutional
principle of separation of powers requires that the political
branches handle foreign affairs. The aspect of separation of powers
subsumes the role and significance of suggestions made to the
Court by the political branches of the government.
The Schooner Exchange also treated the tensions between inter-
national law and domestic law. The Court made allusions to, but
did not rely on, international law. As will be discussed infra, do-
mestic law continues to assert its own priority as a decisional basis
in sovereign immunity and act of state cases.
Litigation involving either the act of state doctrine or the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity commonly involves a foreign confisca-
tion or expropriation. This is true today and was forecast in the
1800's: but for the fact that The Schooner Exchange involved a
taking on the high seas, the case could have presented a question
of act of state. It is in the arena of foreign confiscations that the
strength of the doctrines' unifying principles is most clearly
discerned.
SOVEREIGNTY
Some basic explanation of sovereignty will be necessary as a
point d'appui to this entire article. A sovereign is one who rules;
the sovereign is a dominant, authoritative, public character. It has
Appeal 1880).
22. These ideas could only be but rudimentary at a time when nations did not engage in
purely commercial activities. However, governments did engage in business dealings; in such
instances, they were not immune from suit. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall recognized that com-
mercial activities were not the business of the sovereign qua sovereign:
It is, we think a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in
any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a
level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which be-
longs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.
Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824).
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dominion over a defined territory."' It has the power to marshall
forces - be they military, economic, political, whatever - against
another sovereign, or hierarchically subordinate group.
The rationale supporting jurisdictional immunities2 4  is the
maxim par in paremon habet imperium: an equal has no power
over an equal. 5 But, like "all men," sovereigns are equal in only
one respect: before the law. Legal principles and rules are to be
applied to all sovereigns equally.26 At the same time, sovereigns are
acknowledged as differing in power. 7 Politically then, sovereigns
are unequal; legally, however, potentates must be treated alike.
They are treated equally by the courts, not by other sovereigns.
Thus, the doctrines of act of state and sovereign immunity affect
the ways in which sovereigns interrelate.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino2 s Justice Harlan de-
nied that the vitality of the act of state doctrine owed anything to
notions of sovereign authority. However, when it is realized that
the concept of sovereign authority includes the way in which this
authority is exercised by a particular country, it can be seen that
23. Notice the similarity to the definition of a state: "The state as a person of interna-
tional law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other
states." Convention on Rignts and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 1 & 2. 49 Stat. 3097,
T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. "['state'] means an entity that has a defined territory and
population under the control of a government and that engages in foreign relations." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4 (1965).
24. At this point, the term "jurisdictional immunities" is used rather loosely. It is em-
ployed by many scholars to encompass both sovereign immunity and act of state. See, e.g.,
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. YRBK.
INT'L L. 220 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht]; Dinstein, supra note 4, at 407. How-
ever, courts have been known to assert that act of state does not present a jurisdictional
issue; instead the issue is one of justiciability. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773-74 (1972) (concurring opinion).
25. Dinstein, supra note 4, at 407. According to Dinstein, this adage dates at least to the
12th century, when it was a principle of canon law that referred to the rule that successor
popes had no authority over their predecessors. The term was given its "secular legal mean-
ing" in the early 13th century by the Bologna Glossators, but it was not until the 14th
century that the proverb was applied to concurrent, rather than only successive, sovereigns.
Id. at 408-09. Contra Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 901, n.85 (1969), wherein the maxim is simply attrib-
uted to Bartolus. Dinstein argues that the maxim does not provide a basis for jurisdictional
immunities: "Subjection (to jurisdiction) and immunity alike (as long as they apply to all
States on a reciprocal basis) are in keeping with the concept of 'sovereignty'.... .Din-
stein, supra note 4, at 419.
26. See Schwarzenberger, Sovereignty: Ideology and Reality, 4 YRBK. OF INT'L AFFAIRS 1
(1950) [hereinafer cited as Schwarzenberger].
27. Id.
28. 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
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Harlan misstated the point. How the United States conducts itself
in foreign affairs - the internal allocation of that power - is in-
deed an aspect of sovereign authority. The exercise of sovereign
authority calls upon - perhaps compels - the doctrines of act of
state and sovereign immunity just as strongly today as in the time
of The Schooner Exchange.
Sovereign Immunity
In the Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall noted that
each sovereign possesses "full and absolute territorial jurisdic-
tion."29 This attribute is consonant with the quality of sovereigns
and with peaceful relations among nations. Without respect for
this territorial independence, the dignity of the sovereign is of-
fended and the result may well be war, as sovereigns vfe for terri-
tory. Likewise, if one sovereign could sue another without the lat-
ter's consent, the solemn dignity of the sovereign would be
offended. 0 The courts frequently voice this concern in granting
sovereign immunity.31 It is not for the courts to make war; that
function belongs to the political branches.
Because the concept of the character of the sovereign has
changed, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been shaded ac-
cordingly.3 2 The idea of the divine right of the sovereign has. been
29. 11 U.S. at 137.
30. It is often said that in the United States it is the people who are sovereign. See, e.g.,
Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 13 (1794), where the attorney for the libellant
noted that in European parlance the term "sovereign" included the executive, the judiciary,
and the legislature; but in the United States, the term refers to the power vested in the
people, who have entrusted sovereignty to the three branches of government. See also J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 14 (6th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as BIERLY]. Locke and
Rousseau posited that it is the people who are sovereign. In The Schooner Exchange, how-
ever, Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the sovereign in individual terms. Perhaps this was
simply more convenient than distinguishing between sovereignty and the responsibilities
delegated to the sovereign; perhaps the reason was that Justice Marshall was dealing with
Napoleon. Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the immunity of foreign ministers
and diplomatic immunity; against that background, it is easy to see why Marshall did not
discuss the distinctions raised in the Sloop Betsey.
31. But see Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 602 (1943). Justice Frankfurter, in
his dissenting opinion, found that there could be no affront to the dignity of a sovereign by
denying sovereign immunity, since the courts have great authority. Because of the legiti-
macy of the judicial action, there can be no affront to the foreign sovereign. See also Din-
stein, supra note 4, at 407. Nonetheless, courts are still concerned with offending the foreign
sovereign, as well as fearful of embarrassing the executive (the domestic sovereign) in its
conduct of foreign relations. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356, 361 (1955).
32. See Lauterpacht, supra note 24.
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abandoned for centuries.3 The transformation relevant to the
modification of the doctrine of sovereign immunity concerns the
participation of governments in commercial activities and the rise
of state trading agencies. This fact of twentieth century life has
caused the abandonment of the absolute theory of sovereign im-
munity in favor of a restrictive theory, which has been codified by
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976." The absolute the-
ory of sovereign immunity asserts that a sovereign cannot be sued
without its consent, while the restrictive theory limits application
of the doctrine to instances in which the sovereign was acting in its
public capacity.
Although the Tate Letter was the first formal executive adoption
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, courts have long
recognized the distinction to be made between private and public
acts of a sovereign. 8 And while The Schooner Exchange suggested
a distinction to be made between commercial acts and public acts,
during that time merchant ships were not owned by governments.
The question of whether a government-owned merchant ship
should be entitled to sovereign immunity was first presented in
1925. In granting immunity in the case of Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S.
Pesaro,6 Justice Van Devanter relied on the principles announced
in The Schooner Exchange:
We think the principles are applicable alike to all ships held
and used by a government for a public purpose, and that when,
for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people or providing
revenue for its treasury, a government acquires, mans and oper-
ates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the same
sense that war ships are. We know of no international usage
which regards the maintenance and advancement of the economic
welfare of a people in time of peace as any less a public purpose
than the maintenance and training of a naval force. 7
33. In an earlier day, the sovereign personified the state and could do no wrong. Din-
stein, supra note 4, at 410.
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Immunities Act].
35. The attorney for Berizzi cited dozens of cases in support of his argument that such
distinctions have been made "from the earliest times." Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562, 563 (1926). Although The Schooner Exchange suggested a distinction to be made
between commercial acts and public acts, during that time merchant ships were not owned
by governments.
36. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
37. Id. at 574. Van Devanter did recognize that The Schooner Exchange did not specifi-
cally deal with the question of government-owned merchant ships because at that time gov-
ernments did not own merchant ships. Id. at 573. For the proposition that a government-
[Vol. 11
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This reasoning was followed in Compania Espanola de Navega-
cion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar.88 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that a vessel in the possession and service of a friendly gov-
ernment is a public vessel, even though it is carrying merchandise
for hire."' Then in 1940, the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court distinguished between acts of a private nature and
acts of a public nature, ruling that a state-owned corporation could
be granted immunity only if it were operated for governmental or
public purposes.40
In 1952, the restricive theory of sovereign immunity was given
executive approval in what has become known as the Tate Letter.'1
This doctrine accords immunity to a sovereign only when it is act-
ing in a public capacity. The reasons for this shift in U.S. policy
were stated as: (1) the trend in other countries toward the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity; (2) principles of reciprocity -
since the United States did not claim immunity in foreign courts in
contract or tort, the U.S. should deny immunity to foreign sover-
eigns in similar instances; (3) the erosion of sovereign immunity in
domestic courts;42 (4) the need of individuals who enter commer-
cial undertakings with a government for a forum for resolution of
disputes; and (5) "[tjhe reasons which obviously motivate state
trading countries in adhering to the [absolute] theory with perhaps
increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United States
should [adopt the restrictive theory] .... "4
owned ship that was not a war ship was nonetheless engaged in a public purpose, the Court
cited Briggs v. Light Boats, 11 Allen 157. Id. at 574. In that early case, the United States
had acquired boats which were used to provide light to aid navigation. This function was
considered by that Court to be a public purpose: although the vessels were not instruments
of war, they were instruments of sovereignty. Note the implication that the earlier cases
emphasized war as a public purpose.
38. 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
39. Id. at 74. Because there was no suggestion made by the executive on the question of
sovereign immunity, the Court required proof that the vessel was in the possession of the
Spanish government. Id. at 76. See the discussion of executive suggestions in text accompa-
nying notes 66-92 infra.
40. Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20
N.Y.S.2d 825, appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 1006, 24 N.Y.S.2d 994, order resettled, 260 App.
Div. 1058, 26 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1940).
41. Letter of Acting Legal Advisor, Jack B. Tate, to Dep't of Justice, May 19, 1952, in 26
DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter].
42. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491; Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2671-80.
43. Tate Letter, supra note 41, at 984-85. Number five hints at an attempt by the Amer-
ican government to impose a kind of economic and political sanction on Communist coun-
tries. The State Department placed great emphasis on the practices of other nations, as
19801
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 11
Subsequently, the courts attempted to derive the principles
upon which the Tate Letter was based. In Victory Transport, Inc.
v. Comisaria General," the court catalogued those acts that should
be considered public, with the qualification that the list could be
changed by the executive department. The list of public acts and
the qualifications consisted of: (1) internal administrative acts,
such as explusion of an alien; (2) legislative acts, such as nationali-
zation; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts concerning
diplomatic immunity; and (5) public loans . . . . The court be-
lieved that individual litigants should not have to sacrifice their
interests to notions of comity in any but these limited areas.46 The
Victory Transport classifications were followed in some cases and
criticized in others. 7
In Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea"8 the State Department elabo-
rated on its own Tate standards. The refusal to grant immunity
involved an action against the Bank of Korea for breach of con-
evidenced by court decisions, and placed some importance on the views of scholars. Was the
Acting Legal Adviser trying to sort out international law, or was he merely concerned with
principles of reciprocity or, more baldly, politics? According to Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, the sources of international law are:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. . .. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publi-
cists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
44. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
45. Id. at 360. The court stated: "Should diplomacy require enlargement of these catego-
ries, the State Department can file a suggestion of immunity with the court. Should diplo-
macy require contraction of these categories, the State Department can issue a new or clari-
fying policy pronouncement." Id.
46. Id. The court apparently indicated that the individual should be subordinate to the
sovereign only when the sovereign acts in a sovereign capacity.
47. Ocean Transport v. Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705 (E.D. La. 1967), applied the
Victory Transport standards, while Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446
F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir. 1971), found the distinctions to be "unworkable." Isbrandtsen ac-
cepted Lauterpacht's and Fitzmaurice's conclusions that the distinctions between jure im-
peril and jure gestionis are not "adequately defined." Id. at n.4. See Luterpacht, supra note
24, at 225-26, wherein the author vigorously opposes the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
its absolute form; Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 14
BRr. YRBK. INT'L L. 101, 123-24 (1933), wherein the author finds the distinctions difficult
and even arbitrary. The Isbrandtsen court observed that a contract with a private commer-
cial interest "does not automatically render the acts of the foreign government private and
commercial." 446 F.2d at 1200. However, the court did not reach the question of whether
the act was public or private; the court abided by the executive suggestion of immunity.
48. 298 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Act of State and Further Inquiry
tract and breach of warranty of authority. The transaction con-
cerned the sale of equipment by Amkor Corporation for use in the
construction of a caustic soda plant by a Korean corporation. The
State Department found that the essence of the transaction was
commercial, even though the parties or the purposes were public.
The State Department noted that the Tate standards emphasized
the nature of the transaction rather than the identity of the par-
ties: The ultimate goal of the transaction to serve a public purpose
would be of no avail when the transaction was essentialy
commercial.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761" recognizes that
sovereign immunity does not apply to states with respect to their
commercial activities. Anticipating the difficulty of determining
the boundaries of public activities in socialist countries, " Congress
defined "commercial activity" as: "either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by refer-
ence to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transac-
tion or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 1 This defini-
tion conforms to those judicial decisions that distinguish public
from commercial acts, as well as to the guidelines expressed in the
Tate Letter. The statute recognized that the sovereign loses its at-
tributes of sovereignty insofar as its commercial activities are
concerned.
Act of State
The act of state doctrine was established in the United States by
Underhill v. Hernandez."' General Hernandez was the commander
49. See generally East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Carey
v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press
Agency, Tass, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Recent Development, Foreign Sovereign
Immunity-The Status of Legal Entities in Socialist Countries as Defendants Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 12 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 165 (1979); Recent
Decision, Sovereign Immunity-Service of Process in the United States on a Permanent
Mission to the United Nations Must Conform to the Specific Requirements of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 841 (1978).
50. Immunities Act, supra note 34, at § 1603(d).
51. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
52. The Court held:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
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of revolutionary forces in Venezuela. Underhill, a United States
citizen, was denied exit papers by Hernandez. He was detained in
Venezuela and subjected to forced labor. The United States subse-
quently recognized the revolutionary party as the legitimate gov-
ernment of Venezuela. When Underhill brought an action against
Hernandez for unlawful detention, confinement, and asault, the
court refused to adjudicate the claim on its merits because the ac-
tions of Hernandez constituted an act of state.53 Thus, the Court
implied that the doctrine was compelled by the nature of
sovereignty.
Two elements of the act of state doctrine are easily discernible:
the doctrine relates to the public acts of a sovereign," and it re-
sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252. Note the resemblance of the Court's language to the following British case which
the Court did not cite:
A foreign sovereign, coming into this country, cannot be made responsible here for
an act done in his sovereign character in his own country; whether it be an act
right or wrong, whether according to the constitution of that country or not, the
courts of this country cannot sit in judgment upon an act of a sovereign, effected
by virtue of his sovereign authority abroad ....
Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1848) 2 H.L. Cas. 1. (emphasis added). In Un-
derhill, the Court noted that the principle of the act of state doctrine could not be confined
to "lawful or recognized governments" since the United States should not judge the merits
of a civil war. 168 U.S. at 252-53. Query: what would the result have been if Hernandez's
forces had been defeated by a competing faction? The Court indicated that the act of state
doctrine would nonetheless apply: "acts of legitimate warfare cannot be made the basis of
individual liability." Id. at 253. The Court thought it was answering the question posed.
According to the Court, any official knowledge of the existence of a civil war may require
application of the doctrine to any acts arising therefrom. Id.
53. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-40, Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc., v. Republic of Cuba, No. 73-1288 (Supreme Court of the United States, filed
Dec., 1975). Contra, Dinstein, supra note 4, at 412, where the author presents Kelson's view
that a sovereign act "of whatever nature" is immune from the judgment of a foreign court.
Dinstein himself disputes this view; claiming that it has been repudiated by many countries.
However, Dinstein does not speak of the. public-private distinctions used in this paper.
Rather, he is concerned with proper public acts and the limitations imposed by interna-
tional law. For example, he notes that Israel, in its conduct of the Eichmann trial, has re-
jected the view that any kind of an act by a sovereign cannot be challenged.
54. 168 U.S. at 253. See also Note, Bernstein Exception Applied to Restrict Role of Act
of State Doctrine-First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 14 HARv. IIr'L
L.J. 131, 132-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bernstein Exception Restricts Act of State];
Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 1, at 1225 n.4. When a foreign state tries to exercise
its sovereignty extraterritorially, the United States courts will not apply the act of state
doctrine. In Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966), Judge Friendly refused to invoke the act of state doctrine to a
situation where the property was in the United States at the time the property was confis-
cated, for then United States federal law and policy governs. Applying the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, as well as article I, the court dismissed the complaint. In that case, the
State Department said it was uninterested in the litigation-it should be handled by the
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spects the sovereign's right to self-government within its own
territory.5
Although a Supreme Court plurality in Dunhill v. Republic of
Cuba" opined that a state's conduct related to its commercial en-
deavors is not immunized by the act of state doctrine, the question
remains unsettled.5 7 However, such a requirement is a natural con-
clusion flowing from the purposes of the doctrine.58 Act of state is
courts since it involved administration of estates and rights in property found in the United
States. Id. at 52 n.5. Accord, Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972), where the court refused to give effect to the Cuban ex-
propriation concerning trademarks having an American situs. The court reasoned that an
extraterritorial decree conflicts with a foreign country's sovereignty. Interestingly, that deci-
sion spoke of a "pragmatic view" of the act of state doctrine, i.e., it is employed because the
United States can effectively do little else. Id. at 1027. See also Menendez v. Saks & Co.,
485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. 425 U.S. 682, 695-706 (1976), rev'g Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir.
1973), af'g in part and modifying in part Menendez v. Faber, Coe, & Gregg, Inc., 345 F.
Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967);
Friedman & Blau, Formulating A Commercial Exception to the Act of State Doctrine: Al-
fred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 666 (1976); Dunhill
Note, supra note 2.
56. See generally Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977) (adopting the
position of the four Dunhill justices that there is a commercial activities exception to the
act of state doctrine); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F.
Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(accepted commercial activities exception to act of state doc-
trine); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(discussing, in light of Dunhill, the differences between act of state and sovereign immu-
nity); D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Dela. 1976) (expropriation is
a classic example of sovereign activity; it is not of a commercial character). But see Van
Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (apparently criti-
cizes the commercial activities exception to act of state). See also Rabinowitz, Viva Sabba-
tino, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 697 (1977).
57. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-40, Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, No. 73-1288 (Supreme Court of the United States, filed
Dec. 1975). Mr. Justice White has concluded that the act of state doctrine required a "gov-
ernmental act in which the sovereign's interest qua sovereign is involved." Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 445 n.3. (dissenting opinion).
58. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918)(confiscation for purposes of
equipping a revolutionary army); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)(seizure
of property to satisfy assessment made to equip a revolutionary Mexican army); Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (denial of exit papers to Underhill and coercing him to
operate waterworks for the benefit of Venezuela); Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). However, in the Bernstein litigations the public
purpose of the acts was tainted by the gross denial of human rights that was explicit in the
conveyance. Thus the purpose could not be seen as proper. Yet the court in the first Bern-
stein litigation did not consider this argument relevant. It could be questioned whether the
confiscations of property belonging to Jews, seen in the Bernstein litigations, could be con-
sidered public acts; however, an analogy could be made to the Mexican and Venezuelan
revolutionary cases.
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meant to respect and protect the sovereign character, but when a
sovereign performs acts that can be assumed by a private person,
its actions no longer have a sovereign character or need of protec-
tion. The earlier cases decided on an act of state grounds were cer-
tainly based on public acts."
When the act of state doctrine is invoked, a sovereign can act
within its own boundaries with impunity in foreign courts. The act
may have extraterritorial effect; for example, a foreign confiscation
of property may affect the rights of a non-resident who owned the
property before the confiscation. Even if the property confiscated
eventually makes its way into a foreign country, the foreign own-
er's rights have been frozen by the act of the foreign sovereign
within its own territory with respect to the property that was then
located in the foreign country.60 Under the act of state doctrine, it
is unnecessary that the acts of the foreign government be legal
under its own laws. It is merely necessary for the acts to have been
committed by the foreign government.61 No court can apply any
59. This is what happend in Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918). During
the Mexican Revolution, General Pereya bought bullion from a Mexican mining company
and promised to pay "on the triumph of the revolution." Pereya thereafter sold the bullion
to the defendant Ricaud who sold the bullion to another. American Metal Company, who
claimed to have purchased the bullion from the Mexicain mining company before it was
taken by General Pereya, sought to recover the bullion when it reached the United States.
American could not recover; the act of state doctrine was applied. The act of the foreign
government was effective as to the bullion because of the bullion's situs at the time of the
act. That an American corporation claimed ownership did not affect the confiscation, nor
the act of state doctrine. This territorial principle has come under attack, with its opponents
proposing instead a test that requires the "predominant jurisdictional contacts" to be
outside the United States, so that under conflict-of-laws principles the substantive law of
the foreign state will be applied; if the predominant jurisdictional contacts are within the
United States, then the substantive law of the United States will govern. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41, comment 0) (1965); Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 31, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, No. 73-1288 (Supreme Court of the United States, filed Dec. 1975).
60. In the first Bernstein litigation, 163 F.2d 246, the court was faced with the argument
presented in the amicus brief of the American Jewish Congress that the taking was unlawful
because it had been effected before the passage of the German laws legalizing the confisca-
tion of property belonging to Jews. The court considered it irrelevant that a German court
should have found the act unlawful had the case been presented to a German court. This
principle of judicial restraint, reasoned Judge Learned Hand, is a corollary of Underhill and
Oetjen. Id. at 249. Nor did the court consider it material that the rights arising under Ger-
man law would be abhorrent to the moral notions of the United States. If the actions com-
plained of had been undertaken by private individuals, then the court admitted that it
would rely on conflict-of-laws principles and invalidate the taking. But because the atroci-
ties were committed by officials, the court could not inquire into the validity of the taking.
61. Consider the ramifications of this statement to the municipal application of interna-
tional law. Under this principle, it would be necessary for international law to be reinstitu-
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law except that of its own government.62
Comparison
It is apparent that both the doctrines of sovereign immunity and
act of state originated from notions of sovereignty 8 and particu-
larly, sovereign equality. The persistence of these doctrines is less
attributable to notions of simple respect for the dignity of the sov-
ereign.O" Rather, it is the process by which the United States con-
ducts international relations that plays the central role in the con-
tinued vitality of both doctrines, as will be discussed below. But in
an earlier era, the need for friendly sovereign intercourse was well
understood. It was felt that these doctrines provided a partial an-
swer to these needs.
As the nature of governmental functions expanded to include
commercial activities, the sovereign became answerable for its
commercial acts. The distinctions made between public and pri-
vate acts of a sovereign speak to the nature of sovereignty and to
when, in effect, the sovereign sheds its sovereign cloak. When a
state corporation acts as a private citizen, it cannot invoke sover-
eign immunity: it can no longer claim the nature of a sovereign.
This is certainly so under the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
tionalized or incorporated into municipal law for it to have any use to the American courts.
Note that a government's own laws include its conflict of law rules.
Although the act of state doctrine has been somewhat limited in antitrust cases, the un-
derlying policy has retained its vitality. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434
U.S. 308 (1978). See also Rogers, The State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 COLORADO L.
REv. 147 (1978); Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1247 (1977); Recent Decisions, Act of State Doctrine Does Not Preclude
Adjudication of Antitrust Claim Involving Alleged Fraudulent Procurement of Foreign
Patents, 12 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 757 (1979). See generally Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977); Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del.1978); Occidental petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
62. Justice Harlan acknowledged that the act of state doctrine was originally based on
notions of sovereign authority. However, he denied that the persistence of the doctrine owed
anything to such concepts. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
However, Justice White in his dissent correctly recognized that the act of state doctrine, as
fashioned by the majority, emphasizes respect for territorial sovereignty by forbidding "a
challenge to the validity of foreign law on the ordinary conflict of laws ground of repugnancy
to the public policy of the forum." Id. at 446. The idea of territorial sovereignty certainly
flows from notions of sovereign authority.
63. See text accompanying notes 72-162 infra.
64. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 364 (1955). The Court rea-
soned that since American or Chinese individuals could sue the Republic of China in Chi-
nese courts, then there could be no affront to the dignity of the Republic for the United
States to subject China to a counterclaim.
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nity, and evidently so under a reasonable interpretation of the act
of state doctrine.
Both doctrines recognize sovereigns as being territorially inde-
pendent of one another; a sovereign may act within its own terri-
tory and escape any judgment by a foreign court. The sovereign is
dominant within its own land and it may not be made to answer
for its acts performed in its country. A notion concomitant to the
dignity and respect accorded sovereigns is the requirement of a
certain amount of fair dealing among sovereigns. 65 Traditionally,
sovereigns were subject only to God." Presumably, the latter
would demand fair dealing. A further property of sovereignty is
that the sovereign is superordinate to his subjects.67 Thus, by the
invocation act of state or sovereign immunity, the individual liti-
gant is denied his day in court.
The act of state doctrine professes to favor the security of title
and the predictability of international trade, whereas cases dealing
with sovereign immunity seldom mention international commercial
stability as a goal."s However, implicit in the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity is that commercial transactions should follow
65. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116, 134 (1812) (argument of attorney
representing the United States Executive Department).
66. Justice Rehnquist, in his Citibank plurality opinion, admitted that individuals would
have to forego adjudication of their controversies because of the judicially self-imposed doc-
trine of act of state. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769
(1972). Justice Brennan, however, voiced concern for this result. Id. at 792 (dissenting opin-
ion). It is, easy of course, to speak of the need for an individual's requirements to be subor-
dinated to the needs of the greater society. This would be true if adjudication of individual
claims in such cases actually did result in greater harm than not adjudicating.
67. In National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 372 (1955), the dissenting
Justices feared that to let foreign-owned assets found in the United States be subject to a
counterclaim would be adverse to our mercantile interests.
68. The Sabbatino majority felt that not to invoke the act of state doctrine in that Cu-
ban expropriation case would render titles in international commerce uncertain, as well as
involve the court in the difficulties of determining who held title. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). However, Justice White disagreed with the majority that
self-restraint would in any way serve that purpose, because the taking in Sabbatino was a
violation of international law: "The very act of a foreign state against aliens which contra-
venes rules of international law, the purpose of which is to support and foster an order upon
which people can rely, is at odds with the achievement of stability and predictability in
international transactions." Id. at 459. As to Justice White's argument that a judicial invali-
dation of a taking in violation of international law is necessary to render titles secure, the
Court found its role too small to be of help. Rather, measures taken by the political
branches would be much more effective; such measures include foreign aid restrictions, em-
bargo, and the freezing of assets. Id. at 435. Justice White agreed with the majority that
these kinds of cases in the United States are rare, but he found no reason for the Court's
ruling. The minimal effect of the decision should not affect the law.
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their natural course, unhampered by restrictions based on the
identity of the actor. This commercial purpose is certainly a sub-
sidiary purpose; no widespread agreement exists as to the ability of
the court to foster international commercial stability by applying
the doctrines. 9
Thus, it can be seen that sovereign immunity and act of state are
rooted in the same policy considerations flowing from the concept
of sovereignty. A sovereign is a dominant, authoritative, public
character with dominion over a defined territory. It shall be
respected by, and respect in return, other sovereigns. When this
repect is in any way compromised, there is the threat of hostility
among nations. This threat should not come from the courts. The
doctrines of act of state and sovereign immunity heed this forebod-
ing and accord the sovereign the legal respect that is due its sover-
eign nature. There are of course divergences in the doctrines. Act
of state speaks to the concern for stability in international com-
mercial transactions, whereas sovereign immunity shows such a
concern only peripherally. The sovereign immunity cases in partic-
ular sort out the public versus the private characteristics of the
governmental activity. This is understandable, since an act of state
ipso facto is a public act. 0 Perhaps the nature of the doctrines was
best summarized by Justice Rehnquist: both "are judicially created
to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and among
the respective branches of the Federal Government. '7 1 It is to the
latter that we now turn.
CONDUCT OF THE SOVEREIGN UNITED STATES: SEPARATION OF
POWERS
The continued strength of the doctrines of act of state and sov-
ereign immunity is due to a multitude of factors that can be classi-
fied under the "separation of powers" rubric. This subject deals
with the proper role of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment in the areas of foreign relations. The most forceful aspect of
this problem involves the significance of executive suggestion to
the court; it is in this context that the internal allocation of sover-
eign power is defined.
69. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
70. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1971).
71. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1955).
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Executive Influence on Sovereign Immunity
The eleventh amendment accords immunity to the several
United States, but "the privileged position of a foreign state is not
an explicit command of the Constitution. '72 Granted, the doctrine
finds a constitutional footing 7 a but it is more a matter of policy
than leans heavily on the distinct role of the executive in its con-
duct of international relations. Accordingly, prior to the adoption
of the Immunities Act of 1976, the courts would defer to an execu-
tive suggestion to grant or deny sovereign immunity. These execu-
tive suggestions were often express communications to the court
stating the position of the executive branch on questions of sover-
eign immunity. Even the absence of an express communication was
seen to have significance.
In Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro,74 a case involving a merchant
vessel owned and operated by the Italian government, the State
Department refused to take a position on sovereign immunity. Al-
though a lower court made much of this refusal in its decision to
deny immunity,7 5 the Supreme Court ignored the refusal and in-
stead granted immunity."' Greater deference to executive absti-
72. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974), interpreting Rich v. Naviera
Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
73. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
74. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 481-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Judge Mack ruled that the Pesaro,
as a merchant ship, should not be immune from United States jurisdiction "especially as no
exemption has been claimed for her, by reason of her sovereign or political character,
through the official channels of the United States." Id. at 482.
75. The attorneys before the highest Court did not argue the issue of executive sugges-
tion. 271 U.S. at 562-69. Nor did the Court discuss the significance of the absence of execu-
tive suggestion. In granting immunity, Justice Van Devanter relied on the principles an-
nounced in The Schooner Exchange; the Court found that the vessel was advancing a public
purpose and thus should be given immunity. Id. at 574. This case is freqently referred to as
the only case in which the Supreme Court did not follow an executive suggestion. See, e.g.,
Decision of the State Dep't, supra note 5, at 216 n.11. However, it seems that an important
distinction should be made between direct executive suggestions and executive silence. It is
straining the point to say that the Court declined to follow the executive suggestion when
none was made.
76. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). The State Department acknowledged that the Mexican govern-
ment was claiming that it was in ownership and possession of the Baja California. However,
the State Department took no position on the claim, other than citing Compania Espanola
de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938)(immunity denied be-
cause the foreign government did not show that the vessel was in the possession and service
of the government) and Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938)(immunity allowed
because the vessel was in the possession and service of the foreign government). This posi-
tion of the State Department was stated at the District Court level, where the court denied
immunity relying on the Navemar standards. When the Supreme Court denied immunity, it
distinguished the case from Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), where "this
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nence was shown in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman.7 There the
Court found that, irrespective of the absence of an executive direc-
tion in a specific case, a grant of immunity could be made only on
grounds already recognized by the State Department.7 s If the State
Department wanted to expand or contract the principles of sover-
eign immunity, it could do so, and the 'courts must abide.7 In Ex
parte Republic of Peru,80 the Court exercised judicial restraint to
prevent embarrassment to the executive in its conduct of foreign
relations. Accordingly, the State Department suggestion of immu-
nity was followed.8' Because of the role of the executive in the con-
duct of foreign relations, sovereign immunity was to be granted by
the executive, with the judiciary serving only as a check.
In 1952, the State Department propounded a new policy. The
Tate Letter8 2 set forth prospective standards for the granting of
sovereign immunity: from that time forward, the United States
Government was to adhere to the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity. According to this restrictive theory, "the immunity of
the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis)."s The Tate Letter, however, did not dilineate parame-
salutary principle [of deferring to the standards of the executive] was not followed .. "
324 U.S. at 35 n.1. Berizzi was different because there the vessel really was owned by and in
the possession and service of the foreign government. Id. It is interesting that the Court
bothered to make the distinction, considering that Hoffman was attempting to put forth
different standards than those in Berizzi, i.e., of deferring to executive policy.
77. The Court stated: "[I]t is the duty of the courts, in a matter so intimately associated
with our foreign policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to
an extent which the government, although often asked, has not seen fit to recognize." 324
U.S. at 38. This quoted portion should not be read so as to place great emphasis on "al-
though often asked." In the instant case, the State Department was not repeatedly asked for
its position. The Court is presumably referring to the long-standing policy of the State De-
partment. For a criticism of this case, see Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of
Its Functions? 40 Am. J. IN'r'L L. 168 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Jessup].
78. 324 U.S. at 36-37.
79. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). One interpretation of this decision is that the State Department
recommendation is invoked as a decisional basis superior to that of comity. Because of the
judicial duty to defer to the executive, the Court found it unnecessary to invoke the princi-
ple of comity. Conflicting Consequences of State Dep't Intervention, supra note 2, at 168.
80. The Court, however, did not abdicate all to the executive; it deferred to the political
branch because Peru had not waived immunity. The Court purposely did not decide what
would follow if the sovereign had "unqualifiedly assented" to jurisdiction and then the State
Department had suggested immunity. 318 U.S. at 590.
81. See note 41 supra. The-Tate Letter was a response to Republic of Mexico v. Hoff-
man, 324 U.S. 578 (1945).
82. Tate Letter, supra note 41, at 984.
83. It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but
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ters for distinguishing between jus imperii and jus gestionis.
Following the Tate Letter, the courts were required to apply as
well as elucidate its standards. Yet the letter left unsettled the ef-
fect of executive suggestion. Indeed, at least one court believed
that a portion of the letter" signaled a change in the previous
practice of deference to the executive.8 5 However, the Victory
Transport court, in distinguishing between public and private acts,
added the crucial qualification that it was up to the Executive De-
partment to modify the distinction if it saw fit. The court ex-
plained that any judicial elaboration of standards applying to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity were subject to review by the exec-
utive, in that the executive could suggest immunity in any case, or
inform the judicial branch of its preference for a different policy."
Although executive suggestion could be dispositive of the issue,
many courts refused to be a mere courier of executive determina-
tion. Courts remained active in sovereign immunity cases; judicial
doctrine continued to develop. In the absence of executive sugges-
tion, the Supreme Court, in National City Bank v. Republic of
China, found an implied waiver of immunity because the foreign
government had subjected itself to United States jurisdiction by
initiating the action. Relying on Tate's reluctance to grant immu-
nity, the Court found that equitable principles required a denial of
immunity. In Ocean Transport Co. v. Ivory Coast,87 the executive's
it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of awvereign immunity where
the executive has declined to do so. There have been indications that at least some
Justices of the Supreme Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the
branch of the government charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign
relations.
Id. at 985.
84. Chemical Natural Resources v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 159, 215 A.2d
864, 876 (1966). The court held that an executive suggestion is binding on the courts only in
the absence of a waiver of immunity or in the instance of consent to immunity. The exis-
tence of these facts, apparently, is to be determined by the court. Id. at 155, 215 A.2d at
869. One could conclude, from a reading of this case, that, in the absence of executive sug-
gestion in a particular case, the courts are not bound by prior executive pronouncements;
rather, the courts are free to grant or deny immunity according to their own standards.
85. 348 U.S. 356 (1955). However, the significance of the Tate standards to this case is
not clear.
86. For the oft-quoted lines from the case: "We have a foreign government invoking our
law but resisting a claim against it which fairly would curtail its recovery. It wants our law,
like any other litigant, but it wants our law free from the claims of justice." Id. at 361-62
(citations omitted).
87. 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967). This case, which involved a contract for the deliv-
ery of a fishing vessel, explains certain distinctions between immunity from jurisdiction and
immunity from attachment and execution, those distinctions being generally beyond the
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refusal to suggest immunity was considered to be "highly persua-
sive" but not binding. Although the State Department found that
the transaction involved was of a private rather than public nature,
the court made its own, independent finding on this point; it relied
on the Victory Transport standards and reached the same conclu-
sion as did the State Department. Accordingly, immunity was de-
nied. In Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea,ms the executive refusal to
suggest immunity was considered binding on the court. And in that
case, the executive was abiding by its own Tate standards.
The supremacy of the executive in the area of sovereign immu-
nity was affirmed when the State Department retreated from its
own Tate standards, a retreat which was accepted by the courts. In
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.,5 a case that involved private acts
and in which immunity had been contractually waived by the Cu-
ban government, the State Department nonetheless suggested ap-
plication of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The State Depart-
ment's purpose was to secure performance of Cuba's agreement to
return a hijacked Eastern Airlines plane.90
The court in Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of
Venezuela"9 acknowledged that the State Department had "si-
lently abandoned" the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in
favor of a case-by-case determination based on foreign policy. In
scope of this paper. Ocean Transport explained that shortly after the Tate Letter was pub-
lished, the State Department announced that the doctrine of absolute immunity still ap-
plied with respect to the attachment or seizure of a foreign state's property. However, the
State Department subsequently issued a letter retracting this position and allowing for at-
tachment in cases in which the government is not entitled to immunity from suit. The State
Department noted that, without this provision, it usually would be impossible to obtain
jurisdiction. Id. at 705. However, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Loui-
siana corporation could execute on Ivory Coast's attached property. Id. at 706. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 34, at § 1610(a) allows attachment and execution in
cases in which the government is not entitled to immunity.
88. 298 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). However, the court attempted to cover itself. After
finding that the executive determination that the acts involved were commercial was bind-
ing on the court, Judge Bryan, ruled that "[ijn any event," the acts were commercial and
private, so sovereign immunity did not apply. Id. at 144. In other words, although the court
thought that the executive determination was binding on the court, the court independently
made the same finding. In considering the effect of the executive determination, the court
relied on Hoffman and Victory Transport to conclude that the executive determination was
binding.
89. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). However, the court did not expressly base its holding on
the Eastern plane exchange. Rather, it found the State Department suggestion to be abso-
lutely binding. Id. at 26.
90. 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 407 (1961).
91. 420 Pa. 134, 159, 215 A.2d 864, 876 (1966).
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Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India,9 2 where the court
admitted that the acts complained of might be of a private nature,
the court nonetheless considered it irrelevant that India had
waived immunity in its contract; the State Department had recom-
mended immunity and it must be granted. The court followed the
State Department in order to avoid embarrassing the United
States in its foreign relations. A further step toward absolute judi-
cial deference to executive suggestion was made in Spacil v.
Crowe.9e Even where the restrictive view of sovereign immunity
would preclude such a grant, the court held that an executive de-
termination of immunity is not reviewable under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 mandated the re-
versal of the judicial policy of following the executive's suggestion
on the granting of sovereign immunity." This bill was intended to
"facilitate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states ...
[and toward that end to] entrust the resolution of questions of sov-
ereign immunity to the judicial branch of the Government. .... 95
The standards underlying the Act are based on the restrictive the-
ory of sovereign immunity. The Act eliminates judicial deference
to suggestions of immunity from the executive. Moreover, a judi-
cial determination must incorporate standards of international law.
Notwithstanding the history of executive assertion of its own prior-
ity in this field, the bill had the support of the Departments of
State and Justice." The question of the applicability of sovereign
immunity is now firmly in the hands of the courts.
92. 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). See STEINER & VAGTS,
supra note 2, at 660.
93. 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Decision of the State Dep't, supra note
5; Recent Decision, The State Department's Decision to Recognize and Allow the Claim of
Sovereign Immunity is Binding Upon The Courts and Is Not Subject to Review Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COmp. L. 488 (1974).
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976). See generally Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. 1, 26-27
(1976).
95. Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, and Harold R. Tyler, Jr.,
Deputy Attorney General, to President Ford, (undated) from National American Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
96. Id. As.to the power of Congress to enact such legislation, authority can be derived
from several constitutional provisions: Congress' power to prescribe the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts, to define offenses against the law of nations, to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and from the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, § 2,
cl. 1, cited in foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1975, Section-by-Section Analysis 2, at-
tached to letter from Ingersoll, supra note 95. It must always be borne in mind that the
Congress is one of the political branches of the American government.
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Executive Influence on -Act of State
Since the late nineteenth century, when the act of state doctrine
was first announced in this country, and until recent decades the
doctrine had been developed exclusively by the judiciary."7 The ex-
ecutive first became involved in the application of the act of state
doctrine in the late 1940's.98 In 1947, the Second Circuit heard a
case in which a German Jewish immigrant sought to recover cer-
tain damages as well as the insurance proceeds of a sunken ship
which agents of the German government had compelled Bernstein
(the immigrant) to transfer to a Nazi sympathizer. Because the al-
leged acts were committed by agents of the German government,
the court refused to adjudicate the claim, even though the court
acknowledged that the acts may have been unlawful under German
law in effect at the time of the conveyance. 9 The court considered
the coerced conveyance to be an act of state. Judge Learned Hand
noted, however, that the executive branch is the final authority in
such matters; in fact, Judge Hand considered the "critical issue" to
be whether the executive had removed the act of state barrier.100
Accordingly, the court questioned whether the executive had de-
clared that the act of state doctrine should not apply.10 1 Finding no
97. As early as Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918), the Court recog-
nized that foreign relations were to be handled exclusively by the executive and legislative
branches. In Oetjen, recognition of a foreign sovereign, which operated retroactively, was
found to be for executive determination only. Thus the seed was planted for the Bernstein
Exception. See also Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Abstention?
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1972). Justice Rehnquist cited Oetjen for a similar proposition. *
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766 (1972). In Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918), the Court took judicial notice of the executive
department's recognition of the revolutionary Carranza government. There was no question
that at least that aspect of foreign affairs-state recognition-was for the executive.
98. See Conflicting Consequences of State Dep't Intervention, supra note 2, at 172.
99. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
Jurisdiction was based on a writ of attachment on the proceeds of the insurance policy held
on the ship, the proceeds being in New York. The defendant in the action was a Belgian
corporation, which was the transferee from the Nazi agent who had forced the ship from
Bernstein.
100. Id. at 250.
101. Id. The court second-guessed the executive silence as resting on its concern for rep-
arations and the peace treaty. Since the defendant had acted in reliance on the validity of
the Nazi taking, the defendant would have a claim against the Reich if he lost in this action.
This claim would figure in the reparations. The court did note that an institution was envis-
aged but not yet devised to effect restitution in similar cases.
Bernstein had argued that since the victorious powers had repealed Hitler's laws, then
they should not be considered still viable. Id. The argument did not prevail. The repeals
were given only prospective effect. The court also rejected the argument that the Charter
and the Judgment on which the Nuremberg Trial was based should require civil as well as
Loyola University Law Journal
such declaration, the court applied the act of state doctrine and
refused to rule on the claim.
In a related proceeding, involving different ships and defen-
dants, but still involving the plaintiff Bernstein, the court in a per
curiam opinion recognized what has come to be known as the
Bernstein Exception.10 2 This exception resulted in a reversal of
policy, which was prompted by a communication from the State
Department. In a letter to the attorneys for the plaintiff,103 the
State Department set forth its opinion that the courts should not
be constrained by the act of state doctrine in determining the va-
lidity of Nazi confiscations. 0 4 The court referred to the executive
proposal as a "supervening expression of Executive Policy."' 05 In
later developments, executive policy continued to be superordinate
to judicial standards.
Perhaps the two most important cases for considering the com-
plementary roles of the three branches of the federal government
in cases involving act of state are Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino'0 6 and First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba.'0 7 Although these opinions struggle with the issue of the
proper roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and
while it is difficult to find uniformity in the reasonings of these
cases, the opinions are the most significant rulings to date on the
status of act of state.
*criminal sanctions. Id. at 252. In his dissent, Justice Clark argued that the American prose-
cutor at Nuremberg could surely be seen as representing the wishes of the executive. Id. at
255.
102. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
103. Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to the Attorney for the Plaintiff, April
13, 1949, in 210 F.2d at 376.
104. The reasons behind the executive policy were expressed in the letter:
This Government has consistently opposed the forcible acts of dispossession of a
discriminatory and confiscatory nature practiced by the Germans on the countries
or people subject to their controls. . . .The policy of the Executive, with respect
to claims asserted in the United States for the restitution of identifiable property
(or compensation in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result
of the Nazi persecution in Germany, is to relieve American courts from any re-
straint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts
of Naxi officials.
Id.
105. 210 F.2d at 376.
106. 376 U.S, 398 (1964).
107. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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1. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino °8
The Sabbatino case arose out of the Cuban nationalization of
the assets of C.A.V., a subsidiary of a corporation organized under
Cuban law but principally owned by American nationals. The na-
tionalization, in 1960, was pursuant to a Cuban decree that was
enacted to retaliate against the United States' reduction of Cuba's
sugar quota. The Cuban law provided for the forced expropriation
of properties owned by nationals of the United States. A system
was established for compensation, but the promise of compensa-
tion was patently illusory. Prior to the expropriation, Farr, Whit-
lock, an American commodity broker, had contracted with C.A.V.
to buy sugar. After the nationalization had been effected, Farr,
Whitlock contracted with Banco Exterior, a Cuban bank and gov-
ernmental instrumentality; this latter contract was necessary so
that Farr, Whitlock could get permission for the ship that was
holding the sugar to leave the Cuban port. Subsequently, Banco
Exterior assigned the contract to Banco Nacional de Cuba, also an
instrumentality of the Cuban government. The shareholders of
C.A.V. brought an action under a New York statute providing for a
court-appointed receiver in cases of nationalized corporations. Sab-
batino was appointed the receiver. Then C.A.V. and Farr, Whitlock
entered into an agreement whereby C.A.V. agreed to indemnify
Farr, Whitlock for any losses, and Farr, Whitlock agreed not to
turn over any funds to Banco Nacional or its New York agent, So-
ciete Generale. Farr, Whitlock got possession of the sugar, sold the
sugar to its customers, and received payments from its customers.
These payments were turned over to Sabbatino to await judicial
determination of their disposition. Banco National brought an ac-
tion in federal district court against Farr, Whitlock for conversion
and sought an injunction against Sabbatino's exercise of dominion
over the funds in his hands.
The court in the Southern District of New York refused to en-
force the Cuban expropriation decrees because the taking, being
retaliatory, discriminatory, and without adequate compensation,
violated international law.10 9 While appeal was pending, the State
Department sent two letters to the attorney for amici in which the
State Department refused to comment on the case, feeling instead
108. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
109. 376 U.S. at 420 n.19. The Legal Adviser also noted that State Department com-
ments are easily misconstrued, so it may be best to remain silent. See also Brief for the
United States in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatio in 2 INr'L LEG. MAT'LS. 1009 (1963).
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that the issue was for judicial determination.'10 The district court
judgment was affirmed by Judge Waterman writing for the Second
Circuit. 1 ' After explaining the rationale of the act of state doc-
trine, Judge Waterman found that the doctrine did not apply to
the case." 2 The court declined to resolve the "difficult question" of
whether failure to pay adequate compensation for taken property
is, in all events, a breach of international responsibility. Rather,
the court narrowed the issue and focused upon the retaliatory na-
ture of the seizure against a particular class of aliens.1 The court
held that in this factual context a violation of international law
had occurred." 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the issue in the
case could influence not only the United States' conduct in foreign
relations, but also the role of the judicial branch in this area.", In
view of the principles underlying the act of state doctrine - re-
spect for the international allocation of power among the three
branches of the federal government - the court applied that doc-
trine and thus upheld the Cuban expropriation.1 6
110. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
111. Judge Waterman interpreted the executive communication as indicating that the
act of state bar should be lifted. The second time the case was before Waterman, he recog-
nized his error. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 171 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967). But by
then, that error became irrelevant because of the application of the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment to the case.
112. The issue as framed by the court was:
Is it a violation of international law for a country to fail to pay adequate compen-
sation for the property it seizes from a particular class of aliens, when the pur-
pose for the seizure of the property is to retaliate against the homeland of those
aliens and when the result of such seizure is to discriminate against them only.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 864 (2d Cir. 1962).
113. The court relied on a time delay between the nationalization aimed at Americans
and one aimed at Cubans as indicating discriminatory intent. Id. at 867.
114. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 407 (1964).
115. The court stated:
[W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a tak-
ing of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant
and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or
other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the
complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
Id. at 428. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
116. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 78 Stat. 1012-13, as amended. 22 U.S.C. §
2370(e)(2)(1970). The Senate Report was explicit as to the purpose of the Amendment:
"The amendment is intended to reverse in part the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
. . . Sabbatino." U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 3829, 3852. CONF. REP. No. 1925, 88th
Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in [1964]. The State Department opposed adoption of the Amend-
ment, preferring instead a codification of the Bernstein Exception. Conflicting Conse-
quences of State Dep't Intervention, supra note 2, at 173 n.43.
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Congress, enraged by this ruling which appeared contrary to
American interests, quickly enacted the Sabbatino Amendment,
also known as the Hickenlooper Amendment.1 1 7 This amendment
directs the courts to ignore the act of state doctrine if the act com-
plained of is violative of international law, 18 unless the President
directs otherwise.1 9 The amendment thus reversed the presump-
tion of nonjusticiability on act of state grounds in uncompensated
property cases. The new presumption is that the act of expropria-
tion is justiciable unless the President directs that an adjudication
would interfere with United States foreign policy.
On remand, the federal district court found that the Hick-
enlooper Amendment applied to the case. 120 Following a communi-
cation by the executive that it would remain silent in the case, i.e.,
not invoke the exception contained in the amendment, the court
ruled that the Cuban decree violated international law and the
Banco Nacional's title was therefore invalid."" On appeal the Sec-
ond Circuit found no reason to change its earlier ruling and reaf-
firmed that discussion. A taking that is retaliatory, discrimina-
117. The Act sets forth certain standards of international law. See text accompanying
note 179 infra.
118. The Amendment states that act of state be applied if "the President determines
that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign
policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in
that case with the court." 78 Stat. 1012-13, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)(1970).
119. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The name of
Farr was substituted for Sabbatino's because Sabbatino was discharged as receiver. The
Sabbatino remand appears to be the only instance of application of the Hickenlooper
Amendment.
120. 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (memo.). The court felt bound by the first Court
of Appeals decision: "The Court of Appeals has already determined that absent the bar of
the act of state doctrine the Cuban decree in this case on which plaintiff's claim is founded
violated international law, that plaintiff's title, therefore, is invalid, and that defendants are
entitled to judgment dismissing the complaint." Id. at 838.
121. 383 F.2d at 183.
122. 376 U.S. at 423. This stand was reiterated by Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243
F. Supp. 957, 974-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Because this area involves problems "uniquely fed-
eral" in nature, the Court emphasized: "an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the
competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our rela-
tionships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as
an aspect of federal law." 376 U.S. at 425. The Court noted that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), did not have act of state considerations in mind. Relying on the writings of
Jessup, the Sabbatino majority concluded that international law requires uniformity, and
that uniformity can be achieved federally, but not through the states. But, since the Court
refused to apply international law in this case, did they not slip when they spoke of the
uniformity requirement of international law? Would it not have been better for them to
speak of international relations? They could have found that international relations, to flow
smoothly and with some predictability, require that there be a uniform national voice.
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tory, and without adequate compensation is a violation of
international law and will not be given effect by United States
courts, so long as the Hickenlooper Amendment could be made ap-
plicable to the case.
2. The Supreme Court Analysis in Sabbatino
The Supreme Court in Sabbatino refused to acknowledge that
the Constitution compelled the act of state doctrine. Yet the
Court, in reaching the conclusion that the act of state doctrine
should be determined by federal rather than state law, found that
the doctrine did have " 'constitutional' underpinnings. . .[arising]
out of the basic relationship between branches of government in a
system of separation of powers."' ' s According to the court, the pur-
pose of the act of state doctrine was to reflect an appropriate dele-
gation of functions between the judicial and political branches on
foreign affair matters.12 4 Thus, the court used the constitutional
underpinnings of the act of state doctrine to support delegation of
appropriate functions to the executive branch.
The Sabbatino Court, while finding it unnecessary to pass on the
validity of the Bernstein Exception, 25 did refuse to construct a
rule requiring the executive to suggest application of the act of
state doctrine in cases involving violations of international law; i.e.,
courts could apply act of state even when the executive did not
suggest it. This refusal was not based on a belief that the executive
had no such power, but rather it was based on a sensitivity to the
way in which the executive conducts its business. The Court be-
lieved that the executive often would not want to take a public
stand; the role of secrecy in foreign relations and negotiations with
foreign governments would make such an "unwarranted" extension
123. 376 U.S. at 427-28.
124. Justice Powell believed that the Sabbatino Court impliedly rejected the Bernstein
Exception. 406 U.S. at 773 (concurring opinion); see Metzger, The State Department's Role
in the Judicial Administration of the Act of State Doctrine, 66 Am. J. Imrt L. 94 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Metzger].
125. However, Justice White, in his dissent, vouched for a procedure whereby the State
Department would make a determination as to whether the acts in each case should be
reviewed by the courts; but even then, the executive suggestion would be highly persuasive
but not binding. 376 U.S. at 462, 468. Justice, White would respect an executive declaration
that for the courts to adjudicate would interfere with its conduct of foreign relations. He
would then, if the act appeared to vilolate international law, dismiss the proceedings or stay
litigation until the executive bar is lifted. But as in this case, absent such an executive
determination, Justice White wanted no presumption that the courts should not consider a
case according to international law.
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of the Bernstein Exception impracticable.1"
The majority did not want to rule on the merits because if the
judiciary disagreed with the executive as to whether or not the tak-
ings were invalid, this could constitute a serious interference with
the executive role. If the Court were to fashion a rule of intern-
tional law, it was feared that the rule would interfere with the
unique position of the executive in the development of interna-
tional law.127
In contrast to the majority, Justice White in his dissent empha-
sized the limits to the executive reach in foreign affairs. Foreign
affairs are exclusively the domain of the executive only when
"there are no available standards or . .. [the issues] are textually
committed by the Constitution to the executive. ' ' 1 2 8 Justice White
believed that the case should be decided on its merits by the
Court. He reasoned that the Constitution gave the courts power to
decide controversies between aliens, citizens, and states. Accord-
ingly, the Court should decide the case and in so doing, apply in-
ternational law. Justice White wondered why the majority spoke of
embarrassment to the executive when in this case it should be seen
as embarrassing to the executive that the Court did not invalidate
what the executive saw as invalid. The result of the Court's absten-
tion was to render the Cuban taking valid. Justice White further
noted in this case there was no possibility of further harm to
United States-Cuban relations from Court action. There were no
formal diplomatic relations between the two countries as it was,
and the State Department had notified Cuba that it considered the
taking a violation of international law.
The majority countered that a judicial resolution would in gen-
eral affect our relations with all expropriating nations.11 Appar-
126. The court stated:
When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states,
the Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and
traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it be-
lieves desirable for the community of nations and protective of national con-
cerns. . . . [T~he possibility of conflict between the Judicial and Executive
Branches could hardly be avoided.
Id. at 432-33.
127. Id. at 461. The Court seems to be mixing the concepts of international relations and
international law. Does the Court believe that international relations are to be handled by
the executive, or that international law is to be developed by the executive, or some combi-
nation of both?
128. Id. at 432. That invalidation would offend the taker acknowledges sovereignty.
129. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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ently, then, an ad hoc determination by the executive on the valid-
ity of a taking is within the executive role, but a reasoned
determination by the courts is not within the judicial function.
3. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba3 0
The Citibank case involved a loan by First National City Bank
(Citibank) to the predecessor of Banco Nacional that was secured
by a pledge of United States Government bonds. After Castro's
rise to power, Citibank's branches in Cuba were seized. Citibank
retaliated by selling Cuba's collateral and recovering almost two
million dollars in excess of the amount Cuba owed Citibank on ac-
count of the loan. Banco Nacional then sued the American bank to
recover that excess. Citibank asserted by way of set-off and coun-
terclaim its right to recover out of that excess its losses incurred
from the expropriation. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court
held that Citibank could litigate the counterclaim on the merits.
4. The Supreme Court's Analysis in Citibank
The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Sabbatino in
two respects. First, the Hickenlooper Amendment did not apply to
this case because the expropriated property remained in Cuba." '
Second, in Sabbatino the State Department remained silent,
whereas in Citibank the executive asked that the act of state bar
be lifted and that the courts decide the case on its merits.82 Thus,
the State Department urged an extension of the Bernstein Excep-
tion so that upon executive suggestion, the act of state doctrine
should not preclude consideration of defendant's counterclaim
130. Banco Nacional de Cuba v First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 402 (2d Cir. 1970).
The Hickenlooper Amendment applies only to those cases in which the seized property
makes its way into the United States. Note also that it does not apply to contract claims.
Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
23 N.Y.2d 46, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 242 N.E.2d 704 (1968).
131. 406 U.S. at 764.
132. Id. The Legal Adviser wrote:
Recent events, in our view, make appropriate a determination by the Depart-
ment of State that the act of state doctrine need not be applied when it is raised
to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or setoff when (a) the foreign state's claim
arises from a relationship between the parties existing when the act of state oc-
curred; (b) the amount of the relief to be granted is limited to the amount of the
foreign state's claim; and (c) the foreign policy interests of the United States do
not require application of the doctrine.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 537 (2d Cir. 1971). The
complete text of Stevenson's letter is found at 536-38.
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against the Government of Cuba.13 Rehnquist, in his plurality
opinion, found that the Bernstein Exception should apply to the
case because the act of state doctrine exists primarily to prevent
embarrassment to the executive in its conduct of foreign affairs.' 8"
If the executive states that there will be no embarrassment or in-
terference, then there is no reason to apply act of state. "' a Justice
Rehnquist insisted that his holding did not constitute an "abdic-
tion of the judicial function to the Executive Branch,"' 8 inasmuch
as the courts are free to decide these kinds of cases once the act of
state bar is lifted.
In Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, he disfavored the exten-
tion of the Bernstein Exception contemplated by Rehnquist be-
cause, with such an extension, "the Court becomes a mere errand
boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick some peo-
ple's chestnuts from the fire, but not others'.' ' 3 7 Justice Douglas
cited with approval Delson's analysis of the purpose of the act of
state doctrine, which "is not to effect unquestioning judicial defer-
ence to the Executive, but to achieve a result under which diplo-
matic rather than judicial channels are used in the disposition of
controversies between sovereigns." 8 Under the extension of the
Berstein Exception, however, it is judicial channels rather than
diplomatic channels that are used to resolve controversies between
sovereigns. For the executive to throw the controversy to the
courts serves to confuse the proper allocation of functions within
our national government.
In a separate concurring opinion Justice Powell set forth his con-
clusion that Sabbatino implicitly rejected any extension of the
133. 406 U.S. at 765. Rehnquist jumped from comity to embarrassment.
134. Justice Rehnquist stated:
The act of state doctrine is grounded on judicial concern that application of cus-
tomary principles of law to judge the acts of a foreign sovereign might frustrate
the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the government. We
conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary responsi-
bility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that
application of the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of Ameri-
can foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing,
we of course adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein exception to the act of
state doctrine.
406 U.S. at 767-68.
135. Id. at 768.
136. Id. at 773.
137. Id. at 773 n.4, quoting Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or
Abstention? 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 84 (1972).
138. 406 U.S. at 773. See also Metzger, supra note 124.
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Bernstein Exception.'39 Separation of powers mandates that the
courts make an independent determination concerning jus-
ticiability.140 Rather, the balancing of functions and interests re-
quired by the doctrine requires the courts to examine the facts of
each case, including the position of the political branches of the
government.'14  But Powell conceded that the courts should defer
to the executive, "if hearing the case would interfere with delicate
foreign relations conducted by the political branches." When a
conflict in the roles of the judicial and political branches is evident,
the courts should defer because "the resolution of one dispute by
the judiciary may be outweighed by the potential resolution of
multiple disputes by the political branches."' 14 ' But without such
evidence, the courts have the duty to apply the applicable interna-
tional law.1 4
3
Is a Political Question At Issue?
Justice Brennan took exception to the Citibank majority's rea-
soning concerning a potential conflict between the judiciary and
executive. According to Justice Brennan, such conflict can occur
only when the political branch is interested in the outcome of a
case. Only then is there the possibility of embarassment to the ex-
139. 406 U.S. at 773. In the passages referred to, Justice Powell is confusing jurisdiction
and justiciability. However, he immediately corrects himself and notes the distinction be-
tween jurisdiction and justiciability. Id. at 773-74. It is possible that Justice Powell is set-
ting up a dichotomy based on whose direction is followed: if the executive tells the courts
what to do, it is a question of jurisdiction; if the courts act independently, the question then
is one of justiciability.
140. Id. at 774-75. "I do not agree. . . that balancing the functions of the judiciary and
those of the political branches compels the judiciary to eschew acting in all cases in which
the underlying issue is the validity of expropriation under customary international law." Id.
Justice Powell strictly confines the State Department position of removing the act of state
bar from "this or like cases" to cases involving the validity of an expropriation under princi-
ples of customary international law.
141. Id. at 775-76.
142. Id. at 776. Justice Powell is moving from the role of the executive in international
affairs to the application of international law by the courts. Once it is determined that the
executive will not be confined by a judicial determination, the courts may apply interna-
tional law. In other words, international law is subordinate to national interests.
It must be emphasized, as was done in the dissent, that only three Justices in Citibank
agreed to an expansion of the Bernstein Exception. Id. at 777. Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Blackmun expressly rejected the extension of the Bernstein Exception, as did
Justices Powell and Douglas in their concurring opinions. The dissenting opinion called at-
tention to the fact that the Bernstein Exception can and should have but limited applica-
tion. Before the Citibank case, the Bernstein type of letter had been issued only in the
Bernstein case. Id. at n.1.
143. Id. at 783-84 n.7.
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ecutive because of the judicial determination. And in those cases,
the act of state bar should not be lifted by the executive; to pre-
vent executive embarrassment, the courts must exercise self-re-
straint. Justice Brennan noted that the political branch had clearly
taken a position in this case: the Legal Adviser believed that
American corporations were entitled to counterclaim for the value
of their expropriated property, and the United States had pro-
tested the takings to the Cuban government and had broken diplo-
matic relations with Cuba."14 Because the executive had a view, for
the courts to act could constitute interference with a political
branch of the government."15 Brennan listed the circumstances in
the case that pointed to a political question."' According to the
Justice, the task of determining the parameters of a political ques-
tion falls exclusively with the court, not the executive.1 47 Thus, ac-
ceptance of the executive dictate to adjudicate would contravene
separation of power policies.
Like the Sabbatino majority, the Citibank dissenters acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of the executive taking the role of an advo-
cate in the development of international law. The Court should not
be transformed into an advocate, yet that would happen if it ac-
cepted the preferences of the executive department and adjudi-
cated "where consensus on controlling legal principles is
absent." 8
On the appeal from the Sabbatino remand, Banco Nacional con-
tended that the court should consider the issue to be a political
question within the standards of Baker v. Carr on non-jus-
144. Id. at 785.
145. These circumstances were:
[Plossible impairment of the Executive's conduct of foreign affairs . absence
of consensus on the applicable international rules, the unavailability of standards
from a treaty or other agreement, the existence and recognition of the Cuban Gov-
ernment, the sensitivity of the issues to national concerns, and the power of the
Executive alone to effect a fair remedy for all United States citizens who have
been harmed. ....
Id. at 788.
The dissenters then stated that: "the Executive Branch ... cannot by simple stipulation
change a political question into a cognizable claim." Id. at 788-89. Nonetheless, Justice
Brennan found some redeeming value in the State Department pronouncements "for the
light they shed on the permutation and combination of factors underlying the act of state
doctrine." Id. at 790. But he would not give them conclusive weight.
146. Id., relying on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
147. Id. at 791.
148. 383 F.2d 166, 180 (1967).
19801
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 11
ticiability,'" s since no manageable standards exist in international
law respecting compensation on expropriation. The court, however,
asserted that no political question was presented, pointing out that
the lack of standards made the issue for the Sabbatino Court polit-
ically sensitive, considering the functions of the executive in for-
eign relations. But in the instant case the lack of standards did not
render the issue a political question and therefore non-justicia-
ble. 150 The court retained the ability to "resolve the international
law issue if it felt itself called upon to do so, ''151 as it was by then
because of the Hickenlooper Amendment.1 5 2 According to this
view, the act of state doctrine does not present the question of jus-
ticiability. The doctrine is rather a policy of self-imposed judicial
restraint based on sensitivity to separation of powers.
Jurisdictional or Justiciable?
A persistant question in act of state cases is whether the doc-
trine renders the courts impotent or, whether by that doctrine the
courts exercise power. In Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,1 53 the
Court implied that to invoke the act of state doctrine is to exercise
a judicial power: in the court's opinion, "To accept a ruling author-
ity [i.e., the laws or acts of a foreign government], and to decide
149. Recalling the Sabbatino decision, the court explained:
The Supreme Court addressed itself not so much to the actual difficulty of
reaching a determination upon the merits as it did to a weighing of the political
effect of its making the determination it could have made in light of the divided
views of different authorities as to the relevant international law standards....
This language cannot be taken as an indication that the Court felt it was dealing
with a non-justiciable political question; the Court specifically stated that its re-
sult was not constitutionally required, and indicated that the result was reached
through the utilization of an abstention policy grounded upon the exercise of judi-
cial discretion.
Id.
150. Id.
151. Before the case was decided in the Southern District of New York, the Justice De-
partment took the position that the Hickenlooper Amendment did not apply to the case,
since the case was pending when the legislation was passed. 243 F. Supp. at 962. Bryan, J.
withheld judgment for sixty days to await any executive suggestion that might be forthcom-
ing, since he believed that one of the purposes of the Hickenlooper Amendment was to allow
the executive to be heard. Id. at 981. That the executive had made no suggestion in this case
was not sufficient, because of the erroneous view of the State Department as to the applica-
bility of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The court wanted to be sure that that erroneous
view had not influenced the executive silence. Following a communication that the executive
would remain silent, the court applied international law to the Cuban decree, and found it
invalid.
152. 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918).
153. Id. at 309.
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accordingly is not a surrender of jurisdiction but an exercise of
it. 154
The act of state doctrine is not commonly considered to involve
questions of jurisdiction. 15 5 Rather, the question is one of jus-
ticiability and who has the power to decide whether or not an issue
is justiciable. Occasionally, however, the concepts are somewhat
confused. For example, Justice Powell stated in his concurring Ci-
tibank opinion15 "I would be uncomfortable with a doctrine [ex-
tending the Bernstein Exception to all act of state cases] which
would require the judiciary to receive the Executive's permission
before invoking its jurisdiction. 15 7 But then Justice Powell went
on to explain the distinctions between jurisdiction and jus-
ticiability: jurisdiction "concerns the court's power over the par-
ties," while justiciability "concerns the appropriateness of the sub-
ject matter for judicial resolution. 15 8
In speaking for the plurality in Citibank, Justice Rehnquist con-
sidered the act of state doctrine to be an exception to the rule that
the United States courts will decide cases according to appropriate
rules.159 Justice Rehnquist apparently did not believe that the act
of state doctrine constitutes a rule of law which the courts may
choose to apply. The act of state doctrine, coupled with the Bern-
stein Exception, then becomes not a rule of law but a tool of execu-
tive manipulation. In the same opinion, however, Justice Rehn-
quist stated that the Court has jurisdiction in the case, but can
choose not to decide the case.1 60
The Sabbatino majority spoke around the issue of justiciability.
154. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773-74
(1971) (concurring opinion); Brief for Laylin et al as amici curiae at 6, Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, No. 73-1288 (Supreme Court of the United States, motion
to file and proposed brief submitted Jan. 6, 1976); STEINER & VAGTs, supra note 2, at 672-
73. Sovereign immunity can be characterized not only as a question of jurisdiction but also
as an affirmative defense whereby the court is required to relinquish jurisdiction. Chemical
Natural Resources v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 143, 215 A.2d 864, 867-68 (1966).
155. 406 U.S. at 773.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 774. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr the court found that the exception
contained in the Hickenlooper Amendment giving the President the power to ask the courts
to apply the act of state doctrine did not "oust the court of jurisdiction." 243 F. Supp. at
976.
158. 406 U.S. at 763.
159. Id. at 768.
160. 376 U.S. at 428. The Court noted parenthetically that the use of the Bernstein Ex-
ception in the Bernstein case made sense since the Nazi government was no longer in exis-
tence. There could be no embarrassment to our foreign relations in such a situation.
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It admitted that cases could be presented where it would be appro-
priate for the courts to apply inteinational law to judge a foreign
act. Such cases, however, must involve agreed-upon principles of
international law. Moreover, if these cases were important to
United States foreign policy considerations, they would be handled
by the executive branch.'61
Characterization As Sovereign Immunity vs. Act of State.
The determination of the status of a foreign government in our
courts is no longer the prerogative of the executive. The Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 requires the court to adjudicate claims of
sovereign immunity. Insofar as acts of a commercial nature are
concerned, a state cannot successfully claim sovereign immunity;
where the act is public, the doctrine applies. However, if the acts
are public, the issue may well be one of act of state. Then, under
the extension of the Bernstein Exception, the executive could lift
the act of state bar so that, effectively, immunity would be denied.
The public acts of a foreign sovereign could be scrutinized by
American courts. Of course, this would require that the court char-
acterize the issue as one of the act of state and not sovereign im-
munity. Because of the confusion surrounding the distinctions be-
tween act of state and sovereign immunity,'62 the executive could
press for the characterization of the issue as one of act of state.
Then, it is not unlikely that the court could be persuaded to apply
the Bernstein Exception. Consequently, notwithstanding the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the executive's role in for-
eign affairs still reaches into the American courts.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The tension between the concept of sovereignty and the concept
of international law is instinct in the doctrines of sovereign immu-
161. See, in particular, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976).
162. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1: "The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members."
Further, the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 4, 49 Stat.
3097 (1935), T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 reads:
States are juridicially equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in
their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it
possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a per-
son under international law.
Similar language is found in the CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATEs, April
30, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 48.
[Vol. 11
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nity and act of state. According to the traditional view, sovereigns
are equal and subject to no greater authority. 63 At the same time
contemporary international law asserts that its own character is or
must become that of a supra-national authority.' 6 ' Thus, it places
limits on sovereign behavior. However, serious doubts arise
whether sovereigns will relinquish their sovereignty to a body of
supra-national law when that law conflicts with prominent national
interests. e5 Regardless of one's view as to the legitimacy of inter-
163. BRIERLY, supra note 30, at 101. It is particularly interesting that the doctrine of
equality of sovereigns or states is a principle of international law.
164. See, e.g., Friedmann, The Role of International Law in the Conduct of Interna-
tional Affairs, 20 INT'L J. 158 (1965) in FRIEDMANN, LIsSITZYN, & PUGH, supra note 2, at 14,
in which the author provides examples of the supremacy of national policies over interna-
tional law. The author, however, maintains that "the meaning of 'national interest'" now
encompasses the interests of the international community: "'Co-operate or perish' is a stark
fact, not an evangelistic aspiration .... " Id. at 17. It is nonetheless clear that not all na-
tions view their national interests in that light. See also 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW xii (M.C. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni &
Nanda]. Bassiouni and Nanda discuss the obstacles to the effective establishment of an in-
ternational criminal law, but their observations are pertinent to the nature of public inter-
national law in general. The major problems are "the adamant refusal of nation-states to
surrender or share their power with an international organization. . . [and] the apparent
impossibility of nation-states to agree on common goals. I d. See also Schwarzenberger,
supra note 26.
165. Of course there are those who dismiss the idea of international law as hopelessly
theoretical. In response to those who question the legitimacy of international law because
they think it has no sanctions, Brierly retorts that international law does have sanctions,
i.e., means for securing its observance, but the sanctions, not being centralized, "are precari-
ous in their operation." BRIERLY, supra note 30, at 101-02. Those who accept the existence
of international law generally fall into two camps. According to the monist view, "law" is a
discrete, unitary entity, and international law occupies a higher strata than does municipal
law. The dualist perspective, on the other hand, maintains that international law and na-
tional law constitute two separate and distinct systems. See, e.g., McDougal, The Impact of
International Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S. DAK. L. REv.
25 (1959), in Steiner & Vagts, supra note 2, at 635; Sinha, The Position of the Individual in
an International Criminal Law, in Bassiouni & Nanda, supra note 164, at 122, 130.
For an anthropological attempt at understanding international law, see Bohannan, The
Differing Realms of the Law, 67 (6 pt.2) AMERICAN ANTHROPLOGIST (Special Publication:
The Ethnography of Law) 33 (1965). Bohannan posits that "it is the essence of 'law' to
present a double institutionalization of norms." Id. at 37. The norms of a society or commu-
nity must be reinstitutionalized within a legal institution to constitute law. In his view, law
need not be associated with an unicentric power system. International law, representing a
multicentric and multicultural system, can be effective only in its compatibility with the
cultural norms of the world community. He notes that international law requires not mere
double institutionalization but treble institutionalization: "once at the level of custom, once
at the level of the legal institutions of states, and again at the level of bicentric, bicultural
'international' accord." id. at 41. (The statement makes better sense if "multi-" is substi-
tuted for "bi-.") This version of international law seems to stand somewhere between the
monist and dualist views of international law. In discussing the definition of international
law and questioning its existence, perhaps it is worthwhile to consider Bohannan's lesson:
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national law qua law, 166 the relationship of sovereignty and inter-
national law is put to the test in the doctrines of sovereign immu-
nity and act of state. It will be seen that international law scores
poorly.
American courts have felt generally competent to apply interna-
tional law.167 Canons of construction require that a domestic law
be interpreted as consistent with international law.168 But if there
is appropriate domestic legislation that conflicts with customary
international law, the latter takes a back seat.169
According to Lauterpacht, the theory of absolute sovereign im-
munity is not a part of customary international law. 170 However,
the restrictive theory of absolute immunity may form a part of in-
ternational law.1 71 The question is quite academic since the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity is entrenched in United States law.
The Immunities Act of 1976 refers to international law, without
citation for the proposition that foreign states cannot claim juris-
"The most sophisticated scholars ... have been driven to realize that, in relation to a no-
etic unity like law, which is not represented by anything except man's ideas about it, defini-
tion can mean no more than a set of mnemonics to remind the reader what has been talked
about." Id. at 33. Functional explanations are more useful than mere definition.
166. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), provides some authority: "Interna-
tional law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."
167. "If a domestic law of the United States may be interpreted either in a manner
consistent with international law or in a manner that is in conflict with international law, a
court in the United States will interpret it in a manner that is consistent with international
law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3(3)
(1965).
168. Most countries will apply customary international law unless there is conflicting
and controlling muncipal law. FRIEDMANN, LiSSITZYN, & PUGH, supra note 2, at 104 n.2.
Since there is no treaty or convention to which the United States is a party that concerns
act of state, it is unnecessary to deal with the rule of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), that a treaty can overrule a prior federal statute, and the variations on that theme.
But note the regional convention on sovereign immunity, The European Convention on
State Immunity, n 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 470 (1972). See also Competence of Courts in
Regard to Foreign States, 26 (Supp.) AM. J. INT'L L. 451 (1932).
169. See Lauterpacht, supra note 24.
170. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMEsTic COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
166 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FALK).
171. Immunities Act, supra note 34, at § 1602. The Immunities Act even contains a
Hickenlooper analogue, denying immunity where property in the United States was expro-
priated contrary to international law. However, there is an important qualification to this
provision: it pertains only to commercial activities. Id. at § 1605(a)(3). Some courts will
interpret international law in the sovereign immunities context. See JAM v. OPEC, 477 F.
Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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dictional immunity with respect to their commercial activities.""
The courts draw on doctrine as part of domestic law and are gener-
ally oblivious to the possibility that sovereign immunity is required
by international law. The same could be said for the act of state
doctrine. The Sabbatino majority emphatically proclaimed that
the act of state doctrine is not a principle of international law: it is
grounded neither in state practice 1 7  nor in the rules followed by
international tribunals. And even if the doctrine were a principle
of international law, it would be irrelevant, since the doctrine
could not be enforced effectively by domestic courts: an American
court could not compel compliance within a foreign country. 1 '4
When the Sabbatino Court considered the competence of the
Court to apply international law, it attached particular significance
to the lack of consensus in the world community concerning the
responsibility of states concerning rights of expropriation and du-
ties of compensation. However, Justice White thought the- Court
had not rigorously examined the question. He wanted the inquiry
to center on whether or not there is a consensus on the law of ex-
propriations with respect to a taking based on race, religion, or na-
tionality.' 6 But because of the lack of consensus that the majority
found, it believed that this area was particularly ill suited for the
domestic judicial development. Any decision would be considered
biased, given the well-known political and economic interests of
the United States. Further, the Court characterized the municipal
development of international law as a "patchwork approach. ' '1" 6
Nonetheless, the majority believed that its ruling would further
the "rule of law among nations." There is, then, a distinction be-
tween "international law" and the "rule of law among nations."'7
Justice White correctly perceived that the majority opinion denied
the role of international law "in ordering the relations between na-
tions" and thus questioned the very existence of international law,
the nature of which is to place limits on the power of the
sovereign.""
172. But the Sabbatino Court also admitted that the act of state doctrine is not forbid-
den by international law. 376 U.S. at 422.
173. Id. at 423.
174. Justice White has pressed his point too hard. The Cuban expropriation was not
based on race or religion, although the forced conveyance in Bernstein was. Id. at 440.
175. Id. at 434.
176. Id. at 437.
177. Id. at 457-58.
178. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), citing 110
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In proposing the Sabbatino Amendment, Senator Hickenlooper
foresaw that domestic courts would be free to enforce international
law.1"9 The foreign state would thus be subject to international law
at the hands of American courts. It is important to note that the
Sabbatino Amendment itself sets forth some of the standards of
international law. 180 The Congressional view, as expressed in the
Amendment, is that obligations under international law include
"speedy compensation . . . in convertible foreign exchange, [equal
to the full value of the taking]."'181 It is particularly noteworthy
that the Act appoints the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
of the United States to valuate the expropriated property. In that
respect, then, the United States is the sole decision-maker unless,
of course, the courts are not utilized and the question is settled by
political negotiations. In discussing the relationship between these
domestic statutory standards interpretive of international law and
a discrete body of international law, Judge Waterman noted that
the statutory standards were more exacting. Since on the first ap-
peal1 8' Judge Waterman found the taking to be violative of inter-
national law under less exacting standards, he found it unnecessary
to decide the import of any divergence between the statutory stan-
dards and the international law standards. Thus the court ex-
pressly avoided the question of whether Congress could determine
how United States courts should decide questions of international
law.183 The upshot of the Sabbatino litigation and the Sabbatino
Amendment is that a taking that is retaliatory, discriminatory, and
without adequate compensation is a violation of international
law. 84 But without the Congressional directive of the Hickenlooper
Amendment, the courts would have been unable to rule on interna-
tional law in act of state cases, unless the Bernstein Exception
were invoked.
In Citibank, where the Court was asked to rule on the applica-
bility of the Bernstein Exception, Mr. Justice Powell indicated
CONG. REC. 22848-49 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1964). The Court of Appeals quoted from Senate floor
debates, 383 F.2d at 175, but acknowledged that floor debates are not entitled to the same
weight as committee reports.
179. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1978).
180. Id.
181. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1962).
182. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 185 (1967), aff'g the discussion in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 859-68.
183. Id.
184. 406 U.S. at 775.
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that the judiciary should not abdicate to executive recommenda-
tions in act of state cases. To do so would be to "assume that there
is no such thing as international law but only international politi-
cal disputes that can be resolved only by the exercise of power." 185
In other words, if these disputes are only appropriate for diplo-
matic resolution, which is an essentially political means of resolu-
tion, the role of law in settling these disputes is dismissed. But
Justice Powell hoped that the courts would contribute to the
growth of international law. Given the current impotence of inter-
national tribunals, Justice Powell considered national courts as
"afford[ing] the best means for the development of a respected in-
ternational law."18 6
The reliance on the Sabbatino holding, where applicable, or the
invocation of the Bernstein Exception, minimizes the effect of and
impedes the growth of international law. These rules may show re-
spect for the role the political branches - particularly the execu-
tive - play in conducting external affairs and trying to maintain
peace among nations. But they do not speak well for the develop-
ment of an international legal order that regulates relations among
nations. Furthermore, these current practices represent an adher-
ence to the traditional view of international law, which deals with
relations between states and requires individuals to seek redress
through the sovereign.
The critical question is whether it is more important and/or
practical to show this kind of respect for the executive role, or
whether the executive should allow the courts to develop interna-
tional law. It is submitted that the choice should be - and it is -
respect for the executive. This is not because the executive inher-
ently deserves that respect, but because of the inefficacy of the al-
ternate solution. International law will not grow if the United
States alone will abide by it. Until all sovereigns will respect (i.e.,
self-enforce) international rules fashioned by informed domestic
courts, little would come of such court decisions. What is dis-
turbing is that the contours of "respect" for the role of the United
States political branches has not been defined more clearly by the
courts.
ACT OF STATE AS AUXILIARY TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Cases involving the confiscation or expropriation of American-
185. Id.
186. 376 U.S. at 438.
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owned, property by a foreign government (notably Cuba) com-
monly raise questions of both act of state and sovereign immunity.
Sabbatino distinguished act of state from sovereign immunity in
this way:
[Ilmmunity relates to the prerogative right not to have sovereign
property subject to suit; fairness has been thought to require that
when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be subject to legitimate
counterclaims against it. The act of state doctrine, however, al-
though it shares with the immunity doctrine a respect for sover-
eign states, concerns the limits for determining the validity of an
otherwise applicable law.187
Although this distinction appears direct enough, it is not so clear
in the cases. Sovereign immunity cases often involve acts of state.
As mentioned earlier, were it not for the fact that The Exchange
were seized on the high seas, the case could have presented an act
of state issue: the taking was done under Napoleon's orders. The
Navemar8s involved a Presidential decree by the Republic of
Spain. The District Court examined the validity of the passage of
title. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with this finding,
and concluded that the vessel was in the possession of the Spanish
government, and thus immunity should be granted. In National
City Bank v. Republic of China"" a claim was made by China that
the default for which the bank counterclaimed was a result of fiscal
management and thus jure imperii. But, once it is admitted that
an act is jure imperii, is it not then an act of state? Recall that in
this case the Court did not explore the public-private distinction,
relying instead on notions of fair play. And according to the Vic-
tory Transport standards, an act involving the public debt is a
public act. In Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A.,'10 at least one of the
plaintiffs was contesting an act of state - the Cuban expropriation
of its sugar.' 9' Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of
Venezuela192 involved a Venezuelan confiscation of property. Is-
brandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India'93 may have in-
187. 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
188. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
189. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
190. See FALK, supra note 170, at 145.
191. 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966).
192. 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971).
193. Justice Douglas did not use the term "sovereign immunity," but the implication is
clear. Justice Brennan chided this "strange result that application of the act of state doc-
trine depends upon the dollar value of a litigant's counterclaim." 406 U.S. at 778 (dissenting
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volved an act of state - the' delay in unloading the grain (the
grain contract was the commercial aspect) was caused by an act of
state done for public safety. The court, however, indicated that, if
pressed, it would consider the transaction commercial in nature.
It appears, then, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity takes
some priority over the act of state doctrine. If the status of the
litigant is that of a government or governmental agency, the issue
is sovereign immunity. This is shown by Justice Douglas' concur-
rence in Citibank. He felt the case involved sovereign immunity
considerations (fair dealing because Cuba was the plaintiff) up to
the amount that the setoff asserted by the bank equalled the
amount of Cuba's claim; but beyond that, he felt the case
presented an issue of act of state. 1'' Perhaps the cases that involve
both doctrines have rested on sovereign immunity because its ap-
plication is more mechanical in nature,1 95 as well as more obvious.
CONCLUSION
The doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state are based
on the same historical and political considerations. Perhaps be-
cause of this commonality of background, the doctrines are often
confused in application. At bottom, both doctrines are compelled
by the nature of sovereignty, with its internal allocation of power.
Although the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 places
with the judiciary the determination of the applicability of sover-
eign immunity, it remains clear that the immunity doctrine is com-
pelled by concepts of separation of powers. Although courts will
apply or deny sovereign immunity, unaided by executive sugges-
tion, the overriding consideration is that the executive department
is charged with the conduct of foreign relations. Thus, when immu-
nity does apply, the situation can be addressed only by the execu-
tive. When immunity is denied, the situation is one that is outside
the domain of public international relations. Similarly, act of state
opinion). Further, Justice Brennan disagreed that Cuba had waived the act of state doctrine
by appearing in our courts: Cuba thereby invoked our laws, and our laws include the act of
state doctrine. Id. at 794.
194. Fak believes that the act of state doctrine is more mechanical in nature and appli-
cation. Accordingly, he argues for the abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
the retention of the act of state doctrine, because he believes this scheme leaves judicial
functions intact. FALK, supra note 170, at 144.
195. The difficulty arises in determining whether the acts complained of were commer-
cial in nature. This obstacle must be confronted under the commercial exception to the act
of state doctrine.
19801
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recognizes that the public acts of foreign sovereigns are appropri-
ate for political, rather than judicial, resolution.
The emphasis that both doctrines place on sovereignty and the
concommitant political resolution of disputes will persist until
there is international consensus concerning the proper develop-
ment and application of international law. Until that time, the in-
ternal allocation of power mandating that foreign policy be con-
ducted and directed by the executive branch is the most efficacious
manner of conducting international relations. The hope is that re-
sponsible exercise of. political functions will promote world peace.
